

the Viceroy was emasculated by the Home Government. But a fixed source of irritation has been created. Ultimate re-conquest by the stronger party will doubtless be the result; and permanent occupation of Tibet, as provided by the Curzon or Younghusband treaty, will doubtless be established. In such case a new situation arises in Asian politics. The two great rivals, Russia and England, will knock at China's *back door*, hidden from our view.

Discussion of the history and institutions of Tibet and of the present political situation occupies a considerable part of my text. Knowledge of the geographical situation is of the utmost importance in dealing with these topics. I feel myself fortunate in that no official obligation of any kind burdens me in the expression of the opinions that have arisen from such direct observation and subsequent study as I have made. It is, I believe, true that all others (save perhaps Sven Hedin) who have visited these secluded regions in recent years are more or less embarrassed by some official or personal ties. It is not meant by this to assail the honesty of the views expressed by the two correspondents (Messrs. Landon and Candler) who were permitted to go with Colonel Younghusband, and who have written very interesting and valuable accounts of the historic march to Lhasa. Yet it may fairly be expected that men who have been given such unique favour by official influence should either openly approve the official policy or maintain a gentlemanly reserve. In differing with the authors just named as to the wisdom of the Tibetan War, considered only as affecting the material interests of the Empire, I