

organisations the pay is generally fair and constant. The corruption here is due to two causes: example of the aldermen, and extraordinary power over public women, saloon-keepers, and gamblers, due to our crude methods of dealing with the three irrepressible evils. The same explanation may be given as to the occasional lapses of our police judiciary, though a reasonably high pay has largely reduced the evils in this direction. It may thus broadly be seen that when we fail to give a stated, regular, and reasonable compensation for public service, we find bribery taking the place of honourable reward.

We must recognise that we cannot be governed without paying, on the average, nearly as much for the talents employed as would be gained by the same talents engaged in private effort. The rule is somewhat obscured by the value put upon celebrity, more easily attained in public than in private service, and the varying degree of security in employment,—sometimes greater, sometimes less, for the officeholder than for the private citizen. These exceptions are more readily understood than those supposed to be offered by such great non-salaried legislative bodies as the English Parliament. The exception, however, is much more in appearance than in reality. First, the hard work of Parliament is done by comparatively few among the more than six hundred members, and most of these few are holders of salaried offices; and, second, as nearly all members of the House, and all members of the Lords, are drawn from the wealthy class; and again, chiefly from the class of *inherited wealth*, the nation