

secured by Colonel Younghusband. His correspondence discloses the fact that—as was surmised above—the indemnity had been fixed at an “exorbitant” figure. The adjective is Colonel Younghusband’s. But he wanted to use it “in trade.” He finally “accepts their own proposition” (so gracious is the wolf to the lamb), and provides for seventy-five annual payments, pending the completion of which—that is, for seventy-five years—there is to be British occupation of the Chumbi Valley. That is Tibetan territory—and the military key to the situation.

Here is something out of which enforcement of Clause IX. could be had. But, as logically belonging to the haughty pretensions of that clause, there must be closer touch with Lhasa than would result merely from the establishment of troops in Chumbi Valley—still half a dozen good marches distant from the capital. So it was in the earlier negotiations wisely provided that the British commercial agent, ordinarily charged with the conduct of affairs at the two trading-marts provided in the treaty, should be allowed, when he deemed it necessary, to proceed to Lhasa. Thus supervision and force were reasonably created to perpetuate a control which, without them, must be the veriest sham. Both these provisions have been disallowed, in whole or in part, by the Indian Office in London, and Younghusband has been publicly reprimanded for wilfully exceeding specific instructions.¹ But if no British are to appear again in Tibet, how shall the ghost of Russian in-

¹ The provision for visiting Lhasa was struck out before signatures were had.