

too severely, controlled, and both people and rulers made to understand that in this latter end of the nineteenth century the time had passed when they could raid with impunity, and without ever considering the other side of the question.

It might be imagined that after a war with them, and after the flight of their ruler, the people would be anything but friendly with the British, but eight months later, when I again visited the country, to relieve Captain Stewart, the political agent, upon whom had devolved the task of superintending the affairs of the country at the conclusion of the campaign, the people were quiet and peaceful, as if they had been born and bred under British administration; officers were able to travel anywhere through the country without an escort, and were always treated with respect. As I have already intimated, these people had no rooted antipathy to the British Government, and they form a remarkable instance of the good effects which come of following up a successful campaign by assuming a permanent control. Had we given these people a hard knock and then retired, as we so frequently do, and as we are always recommended to do by certain people, these men of Hunza, like children, would have forgotten the lesson that had been taught them, and in a few years would have committed some act of folly—a raid, an attack upon a Kashmir outpost, or some other aggression—which would have necessitated another invasion of their country, and bad feeling would gradually have grown up between us and them, as it has between the Afghans and the British, though originally the Afghans were well disposed towards us. The theory that if the troops were entirely withdrawn after a campaign, and the people left quite independent, they would be more friendly, is not to be trusted. It sounds very well, but it is not borne out by facts. There are other ways of preserving such amount of independence as a semi-barbarous state situated between two great civilized Powers can have, besides with-