Innermost Asia : vol.1 / 671 ページ（白黒高解像度画像）

0671	Innermost Asia : vol.1
極奥アジア : vol.1

0671

Innermost Asia : vol.1

極奥アジア : vol.1

settlements.⁷ In addition to this pass, through which runs the high road between Hāmi and Barkul,
there are others on either side, crossing the depression between the snowy portions of the range and
likewise practicable for horsemen, except perhaps in the depth of winter.⁸

Geographical factors thus establish a strategic relation between Hāmi and the Barkul basin ;
and it follows from this relation that the route which leads through Hāmi and provides the most
direct and easiest line of access from the Kan-su marches to the tracts on either side of the T'ien-shan,
cannot be kept safely open for traffic and trade, unless the Barkul basin is also brought under
effective control. All that we know from Chinese records about the history, both ancient and
modern, of these two territories fully illustrates the nexus between them and its bearing upon the
use of the important desert route from the direction of An-hsi and Tun-huang.

SECTION IV.—HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BARKUL AND HĀMI

The evidence afforded by the Former Han Annals in respect of the historical nexus that Nexus
geographical facts have established between Barkul and Hāmi is not less significant because it between
is negative. We know that during the period of nearly two centuries which followed the first Barkul and
expansion of Chinese trade and political influence towards the Tārīm basin under the Emperor Hāmi.
Han Wu-ti from 121 B.C. onwards, the Hsiung-nu or Huns, though driven by the Chinese out
of the passage land along the northern foot of the Nan-shan, yet maintained their power unbroken
to the north of the T'ien-shan. Thence they were able repeatedly to threaten, not only the Chinese
control over the oases of the Tārīm basin, but also the far-stretched line of communication which
connected them through the Lop Desert with the westernmost marches of Kan-su ; it was to safe-
guard this line from their attacks that the Han Limes was pushed forward beyond Tun-huang.¹

Throughout that period, which extended to the downfall of the Former Han dynasty soon after Hāmi route
the beginning of the Christian era and for nearly fifty years after the succession of the Later Han threatened
dynasty in A.D. 25, Hāmi and the route leading through it remained wholly outside Chinese by Huns
domination and even outside the scope of Chinese military enterprise. It is for this reason that no from
account of Hāmi is to be found in the 'Notices of the Western Regions' contained in the Former Barkul.
Han Annals, and that they are similarly silent about the region of Barkul. The latter must during
all that time have been held by Hun tribes, and probably served as a main base for attacks against
the Chinese border across the Pei-shan ranges south-eastwards. I have explained elsewhere how
this ever-present threat of the Huns from across the easternmost T'ien-shan determined the direc-
tion of the 'new northern route', which the Chinese in A.D. 2 opened from the ancient 'Jade
Gate' in order to communicate with 'Posterior Chü-shih' or the territory around the present
Guchen.² To reach this ground, which, like Turfān immediately to the south, had passed early
under their control, the route via Hāmi would undoubtedly have been the easiest. Yet Chinese
administrative policy, always disposed to face physical difficulties rather than risks from hostile

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