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0261 Tibet and Turkestan : vol.1
チベットとトルキスタン : vol.1
Tibet and Turkestan : vol.1 / 261 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000231
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but not at all bad in comparison with the legislative
bodies. Our higher judiciary is practically pure.
Our national legislature contains generally about
five per cent. of members in both houses who will
sell their votes for money, but probably would hesi-
tate to thus be brought to the support of any meas-
ure believed by them to be really vicious. Most
frequently—and this is measurably true of all the
bodies here mentioned—the bribe-takers approve, in
their unbiased judgments (if they can be said to
have such) of those measures to which they refuse
a vote unless purchased.
The five-per-cent. ratio of corruption for the Con-
gress of the United States is given as a hearsay
approximation by Mr. Bryce in his admirable book
The American Commonwealth. I had it in mind when
circumstances required that I should know the num-
ber, names, and prices of "approachable" members.
It is substantially correct. Now note the relation to
our comments on Tibetan organisation. Aldermen
are practically without regular pay of any kind.
The government of a city is turned over to them
and they take their pay as best they can. The State
legislators are paid a little. In regions where living
is still relatively simple and inexpensive, the pay is
sometimes adequate; the corruption is less. In our
national legislature the pay is sufficient to the sup-
port in comfort, and without modern luxury, of an
ordinary family. The corruption is still less. In
our higher judiciary, the pay, while not large, is suf-
ficient for comfort, and is, in many cases, assured for
longer periods than those fixing the legislative terms.
There is substantially no corruption. In city police