National Institute of Informatics - Digital Silk Road Project
Digital Archive of Toyo Bunko Rare Books
|
|
Color Thumbnail -
Table of Contents -
Page Number -
Biliographic Information (Metadata) -
Caption -
Color Image -
Gray HighRes. Image -
Facing Pages -
Graphics -
| 0454 |
India and Tibet : vol.1 |
Citation Information
OCR Text
already given up the right we had acquired to send a
British officer to Lhasa, and the right to occupy the
Chumbi Valley, and we now gave up the right to exclude
Russians from concessions in Tibet if we so desired, and
engaged not to obtain any concessions ourselves. I am not
here contending that, from grounds of general policy, this
deference to Russia may not have had some countervailing
advantages. All I am concerned to show is that, in regard
to Tibet, we gave up in the Anglo-Russian Agreement yet
another of the results we had obtained at Lhasa in 1904.
Annexed to the Agreement was a re-affirmation of the
declaration we had made that the occupation of the Chumbi
Valley should cease after the payment of three annual
instalments of the indemnity, provided that the trade-
marts had been effectively opened for three years, and
that in the meantime the Tibetans had faithfully complied
in all respects with the terms of the Treaty. But to this
affirmation was added a most important supplementary
statement. "It is clearly understood," it said, "that if
the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces
has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time antici-
pated in the above declaration, the British and Russian
Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views
on this subject."
Before we evacuated the Chumbi Valley the Indian
Government represented* that the trade-marts had not
been effectively opened since Mr. Chang's appointment to
Tibet, whatever might have been the case before, and that
in other respects the terms of the Treaty had not been
faithfully complied with; and they referred to this annexure
to the Anglo-Russian Agreement as contemplating the
possibility of a temporary postponement of evacuation.
But no advantage was taken of the annexure, and the
only material guarantee we had for the observation of the
Treaty was given up.
To return to the Dalai Lama. Throughout the year
1906 he seems to have wandered about the borders of
1
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
11
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
21
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
31
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
41
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
51
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
61
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
71
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
81
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
91
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
101
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
111
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
121
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
131
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
141
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
151
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
161
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
171
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
181
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
191
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
201
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
211
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
221
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
231
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
241
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
251
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
261
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
271
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
281
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
291
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
301
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
311
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
321
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
331
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
341
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
351
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
361
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
371
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
381
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
391
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
401
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
411
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
421
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
431
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
441
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
451
452
453
454
455
456
.
.
.
.
461
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
471
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
481
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
491
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
501
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
511
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
521
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
531
.
.
.
.
|
.
.
.
.
541
.
.
.
.
546
Copyright (C) 2003-2026
National Institute of Informatics
and
The Toyo Bunko. All Rights Reserved.
