国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
『東洋文庫所蔵』貴重書デジタルアーカイブ
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| 0181 |
India and Tibet : vol.1 |
| インドとチベット : vol.1 |
引用情報
OCR読み取り結果
Council; and not with the Council, but the Regent himself,
to whom the Dalai Lama had entrusted his own seal and
whom he had appointed in his place; and not with the
Council and the Regent only, but with the National As-
sembly and three great monasteries in addition; and with
all in the presence of the Chinese Resident himself. No
one man would ever have been entrusted by them with
power, and no one man would take responsibility. It was
only with the whole together that it was possible to nego-
tiate; and we could negotiate with the whole together no
where but in Lhasa itself.
Granted all this, some may say, but even then was it
worth incurring Russian resentment in order to settle a
trumpery affair of boundary pillars and petty trade
interests in a remote corner of our Empire? Now, I most
fully sympathize with the Russian view. Our advancing
into Tibet would—and, in fact, did—"involve a grave
disturbance of the Central Asian situation." The news
of our signing a treaty in the Potala at Lhasa, and of
the Dalai Lama having to flee, did produce a profound
impression. But if the subject-matter of our dispute was
small, there was small reason why the Russians should
trouble us about it. The matter grew in dimension
because the Tibetans, whom the Chinese suzerains them-
selves had characterized as obstinate and difficult to
influence, had grown still more obstinate and still more
difficult to influence, through their having led themselves
to believe that they could count on Russian support. In
view of Russian disclaimers, we can assume that the
Russian Government gave them no intentional grounds
for that belief. Nevertheless, they had it, and for practical
purposes that was all that concerned us then. The
reception of the Dalai Lama's religious missions by
the Czar, the Czarina, the Chancellor and Minister,
and the subscriptions they had collected, together with
the extraordinary belief they had that Russia was nearer
to Lhasa than India was, had led the ignorant Dalai
Lama to believe that he could count on Russian support
against the British. One can quite realize that the
Russians, with their thousands of Buddhist Asiatic sub-
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451
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461
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471
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481
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491
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501
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511
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521
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531
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541
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546
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