国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
『東洋文庫所蔵』貴重書デジタルアーカイブ
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| 0361 |
India and Tibet : vol.1 |
| インドとチベット : vol.1 |
引用情報
OCR読み取り結果
more definite than this telegram. But the despatch had
not yet arrived. Some degree of discretion was left me.
Was I justified by the very difficult circumstances in
which I found myself in stretching it to seventy-five
years? This was the question I had to settle in my mind
while the Regent was waiting for my reply.
But this question of the indemnity did not stand alone.
It had to be taken in connection with another clause
which would give us the right to occupy the Chumbi
Valley until the indemnity was paid. I had, then, to ask
myself further: Would an occupation of the Chumbi
Valley for seventy-five years as a guarantee for the
payment of an indemnity run counter to any pledge we
had given to Russia? Now, Lord Lansdowne, when he
gave his pledge, distinctly said that the action of Govern-
ment must to some extent depend upon the conduct of
the Tibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Govern-
ment could not undertake that they would not depart in
any eventuality from the policy which then commended
itself to them.
This was said to the Russian Ambassador on June 2,
before Government had heard the result of our announce-
ment to the Tibetans that we would be prepared to
negotiate at Gyantse up to June 25. Since Lord Lans-
downe had spoken to the Russian Ambassador, the
Tibetans had continued fighting, had attacked me at
Kangma, and by June 25 had sent no negotiators. The
conduct of the Tibetans had, therefore, been such as might
very well cause Government to alter their action.
Further, the Tibetans, during our advance to Lhasa,
had opposed us at the Karo-la, and fired on us from
Nagartse Jong. This opposition was indeed slight,
because we had been obliged, after June 25, to break
down at Gyantse the Tibetan forces which intervened
between us and our advance to Lhasa. Had General Mac-
donald not captured the jong and dispersed the Tibetan
forces round Gyantse, the opposition to our advance to
Lhasa would have been very much greater than it was.
Since Lord Lansdowne had given his pledge to the
Russian Ambassador, events had occurred—the failure
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531
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541
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