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The heart of a continent : vol.1 |
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reason for doing. Moreover, they have subjugated people
who were easy to conquer, and the general result of all this,
and of the rumours of untold legions of soldiers stationed in
Russia proper, is to impress the Oriental mind with the idea
that the Russians have a greater strength in comparison with
the British than they perhaps actually have. Some English
writers argue that the retirement from Afghanistan, in 1881, has
had no effect upon British prestige. That retirement may have
been wise on financial grounds, but that it did effect our prestige
in Central Asia there can, I think, be little doubt. If we had
gone to Kabul and Kandahar, and remained there, our prestige,
for whatever it is worth, would certainly have stood higher than
it does now, when it is perfectly well known throughout Asia
that the Amir of Kabul practically closes Afghanistan to every
Englishman. To keep up this prestige may not have been
worth the money which it would have been necessary to expend
in order to do so, but it is false to argue that the prestige is
just as high after retirement as it was before. We cannot save
up our money and expect the same results as if we had expended
it. The shrewd native observers of our policy in Central Asia
see perfectly well that we did not hold Afghanistan, because we
had not sufficient men to do so. The Russians, chiefly because
they have only had very unwarlike people to conquer, have
never yet in Central Asia been put in the position of having
to withdraw after a conquest.
Among other interesting features of my stay in Kashgar
were my conversations with M. Petrovsky. He was a man
with a large knowledge of the world, who had lived many
years in St. Petersburg, as well as in Russian Turkestan and
Kashgar. He had read largely on subjects connected with
India and Central Asia; he had a number of our best books
and Parliamentary Reports, and, like all Russians, he talked
very freely, and, on subjects not connected with local politics,
in which of course we were both concerned, very openly.
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461
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471
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482
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485
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