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| 0433 |
The heart of a continent : vol.1 |
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OCR Text
I knew it, and I think a very remarkable point to note in the
practical working of the system is the rapidity and directness
with which affairs are carried on. This, to an official working
under the ponderous Government of India, seems as remarkable
as the deliberate movements of the elephantine British Govern-
ment appear to the Chitralis. The largest question that affects
their state they can settle in a few days. Though they have
no telegraphs, they can, in cases of urgent importance, send
messages at the rate of sixty miles a day. The whole country
can spring to arms at a moment's notice, and hundreds of men
be moving to the frontier at twenty miles and more a day,
a few hours after they receive the order. I have known a
governor more than sixty years of age ride his sixty-five
miles into Chitral with a large following on foot, in a couple
of days. No time is wasted in useless correspondence; there
are no records to be referred to; the matter is discussed and
settled there and then, man to man, and action immediately
follows. People accustomed to rapid decisions and immediate
action of this kind are unable, therefore, to understand why
the British Government, with its telegraphs and its thousands
of troops kept permanently ready for action, should be so
slow moving. A question arises upon which the decision of
Government is required, the agent in Chitral says he will
refer it to the agent in Gilgit, the agent in Gilgit refers to the
Resident in Kashmir, he again to the Government of India,
and they to the Secretary of State; and back through all these
channels comes the answer, months after the question first
arose. "With all your telegraphs, why cannot you get answers
quicker?" is what the Chitralis were always saying to me. And
then the action seems so slow to them. They are astonished
at the force of the blow when it does come, but if a blow is
to come at all, why does it not come sooner? If, for instance,
Government did not intend to allow Umra Khan to take
Chitral in the winter of 1894–95, why did not they oppose
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