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There is no need for us here to follow the successive operations by which Pan Ch'ao, in spite Shan-shan's
of scanty support from the distant Empire, succeeded in gradually consolidating Chinese control importance
over the Tārim Basin and making his influence felt even in Sogdiana and among the Indo- during Pan
Scythians on the Oxus. But it is worth notice that it was not until A.D. 94 that Pan Ch'ao, with Ch'ao's
the help of a large locally raised force, to which along with seven other kingdoms Shan-shan supplied campaigns.
its contingent, succeeded in completing his conquest by the subjugation of the Kara-shahr region.¹⁰
As long as that territory remained beyond direct control, the route leading to the Tārim Basin
through Hāmi and Turfān could not have been safely used by the Chinese for military and commercial
purposes.¹¹ This circumstance must have greatly increased the importance during that period of
the route which connected Tun-huang with Shan-shan and thence bifurcated to skirt the oases along
the foot of K'un-lun and T'ien-shan respectively.
There will be occasion later to discuss this route and its bifurcation in detail. Here it must Pan Ch'ao's
suffice to note how the natural difficulties presented by the desert nature of the first part of the reference to
route have found expression in Pan Ch'ao's own words. In a report addressed to the throne in desert route
A.D. 78, which the Annals reproduce in extenso,¹² he refers to his policy of 'using barbarians to attack to Shan-
barbarians', but at the same time asks for a small Chinese force to furnish a nucleus for the troops shan.
of the various kingdoms with which he proposes to subdue Kuchā. In order to prove that the
supplies necessary for the maintenance of this Chinese contingent would neither involve expense to
the Empire nor cause local difficulties, the general emphasizes the fact that 'at So-ch'ê and Su-lê
(Yārkand and Kāshgar) the cultivated soil is fertile and ample; the pastures there are luxuriant and
extensive', and significantly adds: 'this region cannot be compared with the one which extends
between Tun-huang and Shan-shan.' ¹²
In A.D. 105, a few years after the aged Pan Ch'ao had retired, the Western Regions, of which Hun
he had been Protector-General, revolted, and as the Imperial Government was unwilling to make troubles
fresh efforts in those distant territories, the Huns soon reasserted their former predominance.¹⁴ In after Pan
order to ward off the resulting attacks of the Huns who were ravaging the Tun-huang border, Ch'ao.
So Pan, a Chinese general, was in A.D. 119 sent to garrison Hāmi. Thereupon the king of
Shan-shan, along with the ruler of Turfān, made his submission. But a few months later So Pan
and his small force were destroyed by the Huns, and the king of Shan-shan, seriously threatened,
turned to Tun-huang to implore help.¹⁵ The Imperial government contented itself with appointing
an assistant 'Protector of the Western Countries', to reside at Tun-huang, and with declaring
a nominal supremacy. But in the course of the deliberations at court which preceded this decision,
and which are recorded at great length by the Later Han Annals in the biography of Pan Yung,
Pan Ch'ao's son,¹⁶ we read for the first time of a protective measure closely concerning the Lop
region and its ancient topography.
Besides the appointment of the officer already mentioned to command a small force at Tun- Pan Yung
huang, Pan Yung proposed that 'a Chang-shih of the Western Countries should be sent, at the head proposes
military
colony at
Lou-lan.
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