国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
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Tibet and Turkestan : vol.1 | |
チベットとトルキスタン : vol.1 |
The Tibetan People 163
but not at all bad in comparison with the legislative bodies. Our higher judiciary is practically pure. Our national legislature contains generally about five per cent. of members in both houses who will sell their votes for money, but probably would hesitate to thus be brought to the support of any measure believed by them to be really vicious. Most frequently—and this is measurably true of all the bodies here mentioned—the bribe-takers approve, in their unbiased judgments (if they can be said to have such) of those measures to which they refuse a vote unless purchased.
The five-per-cent. ratio of corruption for the Congress of the United States is given as a hearsay approximation by Mr. Bryce in his admirable book The American Commonwealth. I had it in mind when circumstances required that I should know the number, names, and prices of "approachable" members. It is substantially correct. Now note the relation to our comments on Tibetan organisation. Aldermen are practically without regular pay of any kind. The government of a city is turned over to them and they take their pay as best they can. The State legislators are paid a little. In regions where living is still relatively simple and inexpensive, the pay is sometimes adequate ; the corruption is less. In our national legislature the pay is sufficient to the support in comfort, and without modern luxury, of an ordinary family. The corruption is still less. In our higher judiciary, the pay, while not large, is sufficient for comfort, and is, in many cases, assured for longer periods than those fixing the legislative terms. There is substantially no corruption. In city police
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