National Institute of Informatics - Digital Silk Road Project
Digital Archive of Toyo Bunko Rare Books

The location of Lien-yün near Sarhad, as originally proposed by M. Chavannes, is confirmed Tibetan de-
by the description of the battle by which the Chinese general rendered himself master of the Tibetan feat at Lien-
position and of the route it was intended to guard. But, as I shall have occasion to discuss the yün.
topographical details hereafter, a brief summary must now suffice. The stronghold of Lien-yün itself
was occupied by a thousand Tibetans, and the river which lay to their front offered a serious
obstacle, being then in flood. The main force of the enemy, comprising 8,000 or 9,000 men,
was posted fifteen li, or about three miles, to the south, where advantage had been taken of the
mountainous ground to erect palisades. Kao Hsien-chih, however, after offering a sacrifice to
the river, succeeded with a picked body of mounted men in crossing unopposed and without loss.
Encouraged by this success the Chinese general at once attacked, leading his troops up the mountain
side and engaging the defenders in a fight which ended in their complete defeat with heavy loss, and
the precipitate flight of the survivors during the night. In their pursuit the Chinese inflicted a loss
upon them of 5,000 men killed and a thousand prisoners, while all the rest dispersed. Over
a thousand horses and abundant stores and arms fell into the hands of the victors. It is clear that
this battle was fought at the entrance of the valley which ascends south towards the Baröghil saddle
from opposite Sarhad.⁸

As Pien Ling-ch'êng, the Imperial Commissioner, and certain other high officers feared the Chinese Ad-
vance across
from Kāshgar in successive stages by the same route of which natural difficulty, to fall back upon. Of the territories of Mount T'an-
Tāsh-kurghān, 'the post of the Ts'ung-ling Mountains', was Yāsin, Gilgit, Baltistān, through which this line led we know cha.
the advanced base or point d'appui. If Kao Hsien-chih that they could not provide any surplus supplies for an
moved ahead with the first column or detachment to Shighnān army (cf. Ancient Khotan, i, pp. 11 sqq.).
and was followed at considerable intervals by the other two The problem, as it seems to me, is not so much how
detachments, the advantages gained as regards supplies and the Chinese general succeeded in overcoming the difficulties
transport must have been very great. His own column of his operations across the Pāmirs, but how the Tibetans
would have reached a fresh base of supplies in Shighnān ever managed to bring a force of nine or ten thousand
while the second was moving across the main Pāmirs and men across the Darkôt to Sarhad and to maintain it there
the third arriving in Sarikol from the plains. Thus the great in the almost total absence of local resources. It is certainly
strain of having to feed simultaneously the whole force on significant that neither before nor after these events do we
ground absolutely devoid of local resources was avoided. It hear of any other attempt of the Tibetans to attack the
must be remembered that once on the middle Oxus the Chinese power in the Tārim Basin by way of the uppermost
Chinese Commissariat could easily draw upon the abundant Oxus, constant, and in the end successful, as their aggression
produce of Badakhshān, and that for the column left on the was during the eighth century A. D.
Pāmirs the relatively easy route across the Alai would be The boldness of the plan which made Kao Hsien-chih's
available for drawing supplies from the rich plains of Farghāna, offensive possible and crowned it in the end with deserved
then still under Chinese control. success, must, I think, command admiration quite as much
By disposing his force en échelon from Shighnān to Sarikol as the actual crossing of the Darkôt. The student of military
Kao Hsien-chih obtained also a strategically advantageous history has, indeed, reason to regret that the Chinese record
position. He was thus able to concert the simultaneous does not furnish us with any details about the organization
convergent movement of his columns upon the Tibetans at which rendered this first and, as far as we know, last crossing
Sarhad, without unduly exposing any of his detachments to of the Pāmirs by a large regular force possible. But whatever
separate attack and defeat by a superior Tibetan force; for our opinion may be about the fighting qualities of the
the Tibetans could not leave their position at Sarhad without Chinese soldier as judged by our standards—and there is
imminent risk of being cut off from the Baröghil, their only characteristic evidence of their probably not having been
line of communication. At the same time the disposition of much more serious in T'ang times than they are now—
the Chinese forces effectively precluded any Tibetan advance it is certain that those who know the formidable obstacles
either upon Sarikol or Badakhshān. Difficult as Kao Hsien- of deserts and mountains which Chinese troops have success-
chih's operations must have been across the Pāmirs, yet he had fully faced and overcome during modern times, will not
the great advantage of commanding two, if not three, inde- feel altogether surprised at the power of resource and pains-
pendent lines of supplies (from Kāshgar-Yarkand; Badakh- taking organization which the success of Kao Hsien-chih's
shān; eventually Farghāna), whereas the Tibetan force of operations indisputably attests in that long-forgotten Chinese
about equal strength cooped up at the debouchure of the leader and those who shared his efforts.
Baröghil had only a single line, and one of exceptional