国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
『東洋文庫所蔵』貴重書デジタルアーカイブ
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| 0171 |
Serindia : vol.2 |
| セリンディア : vol.2 |
引用情報
OCR読み取り結果
communication which linked the headquarters at T. xiv, i.e., as I assume, the Jade Gate, as well as
the stations further east, with the nearest inhabited area at Nan-hu, or *Yang kuan*, would have been
completely exposed.
In the absence of direct documentary evidence the explanation here offered cannot be con- Retrench-
sidered as definitely proved. But it appears to me strongly supported, not only by all topographical ment due to
facts but also by any historical information that the Chinese Annals furnish for this period. This Hun
retrenchment of the westernmost frontier line of the empire towards the end of Wang Mang's reign troubles.
or very soon after would have been fully in keeping with a well-attested contemporary change in
Chinese policy. Serious trouble had arisen about A.D. 9 with the Hsiung-nu, or Huns, through
Wang Mang's action towards the *Shan-yü*, their paramount chief, and disorders broke out in the
'Western Regions', which the Chinese were unable to protect adequately against Hun raids from
the north.⁵ After A.D. 16, the Former Han Annals tell us, the Hsiung-nu 'made a grand attack
on the northern border; while the Western Regions were broken up and scattered like loose tiles'.
We are informed also that 'some years later (A.D. 23), when Wang Mang was dead', the authority
of the Chinese Governor-General of the Western Regions 'was annihilated, and the power of China
in the Western Regions was at a minimum'.⁶
After the accession of the Later Han dynasty in A.D. 25 these conditions continued. As the Passive
*Hou Han shu* clearly states, the Western Regions during the first two reigns were allowed to frontier de-
remain under the power of the Huns, who during the period A.D. 58–75 even succeeded in making fence during
inroads into four commands of *Ho-hsi*, including Tun-huang and westernmost Kan-su.⁷ It is certain first cent.
that, during the half-century following Wang Mang's death, Chinese policy was no longer concerned A. D.
about imperial expansion westwards, but, until the last quarter of the first century A.D., kept strictly
on the defensive. The statements of the Later Han Annals are very precise on this point, and
they afford additional justification for the belief that the retrenchment of the line of the Limes,
which I assume to be represented by the transverse wall passing outside T. xiv, took place shortly
before or during that period of passive defence on the westernmost frontier.
In the light which the topographical and historical facts just discussed shed upon the character Jade Gate
and origin of this transverse wall, it is easy to realize that the direction of its line just towards retained at
T. xiv distinctly confirms the location there of the Jade Gate. By adopting this alignment for the T. xiv.
new wall it was possible to retain the traditional site of the Yü-mên headquarters, and with it also
the natural advantages of position for which it had originally been chosen. Equally important
probably was another consideration. From the very beginning, when the western frontier of the
empire was extended to the region of Tun-huang, we find the two 'barriers' of *Yü-mên* and *Yang*
always mentioned in close conjunction by the Annals of both Han dynasties.⁸ There can be no
doubt that the frontier troops stationed there were meant to offer mutual support. We have seen
above that the 'Yang barrier' must be located at the present Nan-hu, and that the Jade Gate was
certainly situated to the north-west of it and on the line defended by the main wall and watch-stations
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31
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41
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51
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61
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71
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81
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91
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101
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121
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131
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141
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151
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161
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169
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251
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261
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271
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282
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292
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302
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312
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322
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332
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342
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352
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362
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372
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382
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392
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402
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412
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422
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432
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442
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452
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462
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472
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482
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492
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502
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512
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522
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532
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542
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552
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562
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572
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582
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592
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594
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