IIIFカラー高解像度
国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
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| IIIFカラー高解像度 |
| India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
| インドとチベット : vol.1 |
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引用情報
SUGGESTED OCCUPATION OF CHUMBI 61
delay, but it was plain that the Amban at Lhasa was
unable to give effect to the wishes of his Government in
consequence of the opposition manifested by the Lamas,
who exercised the real authority in 'Tibet. The contem-
plated withdrawal of Mr. White to Gantok would un-
doubtedly, he thought—and events proved him to be
absolutely right—cause a loss of prestige, would be looked
upon by the Tibetans as a rebuff to British authority, and
would encourage them in high-handed acts and demands,
and possibly outrages. He had no doubt that if the
British Government had only to deal with Tibet, the
wisest policy would be to give them warning that unless
they at once made arrangements to co-operate in the work
of delimitation it would be done without them, and that
unless they appointed a ruler on their side who could
protect the pillars set up, the British Government would
march in and hold the Chumbi Valley in pawn, either
temporarily or permanently. Such a brusque and high-
handed line of conduct, added the Lieutenant-Governor,
was the only one that frontier tribes who have reached the
stage of civilization of the Tibetans could understand. But
the affair, he allowed, was complicated by the relations of
Government with China, and our desire to uphold the
weak and tottering authority of the Chinese in Lhasa, the
result of which was that the people who were in real
power were not those we dealt with, and that the people
we dealt with had no power to carry out their engage-
ments with us. In the circumstances, Sir Charles Elliott
advocated such negotiations with the Chinese Govern-
ment as would leave the British Government free to
march in and hold the Chumbi Valley, with their consent,
and without any detriment to the Chinese suzerainty,
but with the object of assisting them to establish their
authority more firmly at Lhasa. At any rate, we ought,
he considered, to intimate in a firm and friendly way to
the Peking Government that either they must get their
orders carried out or we must. He reminded the
Government of India that nothing had been exacted as
the result of the British victories at Lengtu and on the
Jelap-la—not even compensation for the cost of the cam-
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