IIIFカラー高解像度
国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
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| IIIFカラー高解像度 |
| India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
| インドとチベット : vol.1 |
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引用情報
ADVANTAGES OF INTIMACY 427
k
ki failed. We have given the other line three trials, and
a on each occasion it has succeeded. All the forbearance
ii and patience which we showed in countermanding the
iii despatch of Macaulay's Mission, and in trusting to the
10 consideration of the Chinese and Tibetans, only led to
ii the Sikkim campaign. Similar forbearance after 1888
merely led to the armed Mission of 1904. And the desire
4 to have as little as possible to do with Tibet since 1904
has, after all, resulted in the reassembling of troops upon
ik our frontier and protests to Peking. I am not contend-
i ing that no forbearance, moderation, and patience should
H be shown. My own proceedings are good enough testi-
mony of my belief in the efficacy of these qualities. My
contention is that there must be moderation even in
!' moderation, and forbearance even in forbearing, and that
~i the obstinate determination to have nothing, or as little
as possible, to do with Tibet has brought on exactly
what we wanted to avoid. On the other hand, when
t we have gone forward and made efforts to get in touch
with the Tibetans, to understand them and explain
ourselves to them, a more settled state has always
I resulted. After Bogle's and 'T'urner's Missions in the
M eighteenth century, and after the Mission of 1904, there
was a perceptibly better feeling between us and the
it Tibetans, all tending to that orderliness on our frontier
F which is what we most desire. The closer contact and
more intimate touch, besides being the more humane
method, diminishes rather than increases the risk of
trouble. As a case in point, I consider that if we had
had a representative at Lhasa this year, or even if our
agent at Gyantse had been able to proceed to Lhasa, the
present trouble need not have arisen. Knowing what
British officers are by their personal influence able to
accomplish, I believe that if Major O'Connor, or Major
Gurdon, or Major Dew, or one or other of a dozen similar
officers who are to be found in India, had been at Lhasa
last winter, he would have been able to nip this trouble in
the bud. And this not by giving the Tibetans out-and-
out support against their legitimate suzerain, but by
telling them frankly what the limits were beyond which it
r±~ .
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