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0161 India and Tibet : vol.1
インドとチベット : vol.1
India and Tibet : vol.1 / 161 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000295
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TIBETANS ASSEMBLE TROOPS   129

winter, when our communications would be cut off. Their

immediate policy was one of passive obstruction. They

had made up their minds to have no negotiations with us

inside Tibet, and they would simply leave us at Khamba

Jong, while if we tried to advance farther, they would

oppose us by force. They were afraid that if they gave

us an inch we would take an ell, and if they allowed us at

Khamba Jong one year we should go to Shigatse the next,

and Lhasa the year after. So they were determined to

stop us at the start.

'The Shigatse Abbot had, I heard, done his best to

make the Lhasa officials take a more reasonable view, but

without success. The Lhasa officials were entirely ruled

by the National Assembly at Lhasa, and this Assembly

was composed chiefly of Lhasa monks.

It was difficult to understand why there was all this

trouble about negotiating at Khamba Jong, for the

Chinese Government had informed our Minister at

Peking on July 19 that the Imperial Resident had

now arranged with the Dalai Lama to appoint two

Tibetan officials of fairly high standing to proceed with

the Prefect Ho to Khamba to meet Major Younghusband

and Mr. White, and discuss with them what steps are to

be taken." The Chinese Government added that they

trusted it would be possible to effect a speedy and

friendly settlement of this long-standing dispute, and

requested Mr. Townley to acquaint his Government by

telegraph with the contents of this communication, so

that Major Younghusband and Mr. White might be

instructed to open negotiations in a friendly spirit with

the Tibetan and other delegates appointed, and it was

hoped that the pending questions would then be speedily

and finally settled.

The Chinese Government did, indeed, ask the British

Government to withdraw the troops we had with us at

Khamba Jong, but this was on the strength of a report

they had received that when I was to follow Mr. White

to Khamba Jong, I was to bring with me the 300 men who

formed the support left at Tangu.

That the Dalai Lama himself had agreed to Khamba

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