国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
| |||||||||
|
India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
インドとチベット : vol.1 |
CHAPTER XXI
THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION
EVEN in the present year I was asked by a Cabinet
Minister what good we did in going to Lhasa. Since that
question was asked one striking result of our Mission has
come to light, in the fact of the Dalai Lama, who before
we went to Lhasa would not even receive a communica-
tion from the Viceroy, now in person, at Calcutta itself,
appealing to the Viceroy to preserve his right of direct
communication with us. The suspicious and hostile atti-
tude of the Tibetans has so far changed that they have
now asked us to form an alliance, and to send a British
officer to their sacred city. To attribute this change
entirely to the effects of the Mission may not be
justifiable. Much is due to the tactlessness of the Chinese
treatment of the Tibetans. But the change in direction
of Tibetan feeling was visible before we left Lhasa, and
there is good cause for assuming that if Lord Curzon had
never despatched the Mission to break through the
Tibetan reserve, they would have still been as inimical to
us and as inclined towards Russia as they were six years
ago. The conversion of our north-eastern neighbours
from potential enemies into applicant allies may be taken
as one result of the Mission.
When the Mission was despatched into Tibet, we had
for thirty years been trying to regulate our intercourse
with our Tibetan neighbours, but had obtained no success
whatever. The Treaty which their suzerain had made
with us was repudiated. Boundary pillars were thrown
down, trade was boycotted, our communications were
returned. And the Dalai Lama showed a decided leaning
towards the Russians. As a result of Lord Curzon's policy
335
|
Copyright (C) 2003-2019
National Institute of Informatics(国立情報学研究所)
and
The Toyo Bunko(東洋文庫). All Rights Reserved.
本ウェブサイトに掲載するデジタル文化資源の無断転載は固くお断りいたします。