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0500 India and Tibet : vol.1
インドとチベット : vol.1
India and Tibet : vol.1 / 500 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000295
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426   SOME CONCLUSIONS

for the preservation of order upon our frontier it is highly

desirable that we should see that these intentions are

carried out. As I have admitted, the Tibetans do require

being kept in control up to a certain limit. They have

been very recalcitrant, and must expect to be brought

to book. But when the Chinese go beyond merely keep-

ing order, when they drive the Dalai Lama from his

capital, depose him, seize his Government, garrison the

whole country, and direct the administration themselves,

then they simply cause a general discontent and uneasi-

ness upon our frontier, and, from the point of view of

expediency alone, we are then justified in intervening, as

we intervened in Egypt when the 'Turks tried to increase

their degree of suzerainty beyond its normal limits.

As to the method of intervention, my own view is

decidedly in favour of sending a British officer to Lhasa

itself. The Tibetans have actually asked for this to be

done, so there is no difficulty on that score, and it is

within the Chinese Empire, so the Chinese, if they wish to

be considered in any way a civilized Power, should have no

objection on their side. It is at Lhasa that a British officer

could most effectively explain to the Chinese the limits

beyond which it is impossible for us to countenance their

proceeding, and it is there also that he could best impress

the Tibetans of the bounds within which alone we can have

relationship with them, or render them support. If such

an officer could find it feasible to visit Peking and

London before proceeding to Lhasa, he ought to be able

to put Tibetan affairs upon a footing adapted to all the

interests concerned. And as to risk, if we keep an officer

at Gyantse we might as well send one to Lhasa.

Whether this is done or no we ought, in my view, to

alter our whole attitude to the Tibetan question. Instead

of expecting to secure peace by shrinking from having

anything to do with the people, we should rather put our-

selves forward to acquire increased intimacy. We should

seek to secure quiet by the more effective and certain

method of deliberately making use of every means we have

of keeping up and increasing contact with the Tibetans.

We have given the one line three great trials, and it has