IIIFカラー高解像度
国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
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| IIIFカラー高解像度 |
| India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
| インドとチベット : vol.1 |
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引用情報
378 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS
Majesty's thanks for his message and of his interest in his
welfare. The Russian Minister said that he wished the
Ambassador should hear exactly what had occurred, as the
Press would probably make out that the audience had a
political character.
The Czar also sent the Dalai Lama a complimentary
telegram, in regard to which our Ambassador spoke
to Count Lamsdorff in April, 1906. The Russian
Chancellor informed Mr. Spring-Rice that the policy of
his Government with regard to 'Tibet was the same as
that of His Majesty's Government—namely, that of non-
intervention. They wished the Dalai Lama to return as
soon as possible to Lhasa, as they considered his continued
presence in Mongolia undesirable, but he had fears for the
safety of his person on his return, and had asked for a
promise of protection. The telegram had been sent in
place of this promise, and was designed to reassure, not
only the Dalai Lama himself, but also the Emperor's
Buddhist subjects, with regard to whom the Russian
Government would find themselves in a very embarrassing
position should any mishap befall the Lama. The inten-
tion of the Russian Government, Count Lamsdorff in-
formed our Ambassador, was to keep us fully informed in
order to avoid all misunderstanding.
Here it may be convenient to interpolate an account
of the agreement which was come to in the following year
between the Russians and ourselves in regard to 'Tibet.
By the Convention of August 31, 1907, generally known
as the Anglo-Russian Agreement, the suzerain right of
China in Tibet was recognized, but, considering the
fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical
position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the
status quo in the external relations of 'Tibet," the follow-
ing arrangement was made. Both parties engaged to
respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain
from all interference in its internal administration." They,
secondly, engaged not to enter into negotiations with
Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese
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