国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
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India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
インドとチベット : vol.1 |
132 KHAMBA JONG
the 9th, that I thought that the Viceroy's reply to the
Resident might have some effect upon the Chinese at least.
Both Chinese and 'Tibetans had so far been under the
impression that the present mission was only one more of
the futile little missions which had come and gone on the
Sikkim frontier for years past. They thought that if they
could be obstructive enough during the summer and
autumn, we should no doubt return before the winter. On
this point the Viceroy's letter would leave them in no
doubt. It was clear from that that we intended to stay
for the winter. Besides this I had, I said, in conversation
with Mr. Ho and the Shigatse people, tried to bring both
the Chinese and the Tashi Lama round to putting
pressure on the obstinate Lhasa monks. But there was
little hope, I thought, that mere verbal persuasion would
be sufficient. Direct action would be required. The
despatch of a second Pioneer regiment to put the road
to the Jelap-la (pass) in order, had, I understood, been
ordered. I recommended, therefore, that about the same
time my escort should be strengthened by 100 men from
the support.
What I thought, however, would have a greater effect
than anything else upon the Tibetans would be the
demonstrating to them that the Nepalese were on our
side, and not theirs. The Nepalese Minister had offered
8,000 yaks. I would have 500 of these march across to us
by the Tinki Jong route, and would recommend that
a suitable representative of the Nepalese Durbar should
accompany them for the purpose of formally handing
them over to us. This would be a sign which the Tibetans
could not mistake that the Nepalese were on our side.
The strengthening of my escort and the appearance of
the Nepalese yaks might be made to coincide with the
concentration of the 23rd Pioneers in the neighbourhood
of the Jelap-la (pass) in about a month's time. This I
thought was all that could be done to bring the Tibetans
to a more suitable frame of mind. If these measures
failed, an advance into the Chumbi Valley was the most
obvious course to take, for the Jelap-la could be crossed at
any time during the winter, and along the Chumbi Valley
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