国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
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India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
インドとチベット : vol.1 |
OBJECTIONS TO EVACUATION 357
sidered of sufficient importance to justify a warning either
to Tibet or China that there had been a failure to comply
with the conditions on which our evacuation of Chumbi
depended. The fact that we kept silence at the time that
these incidents occurred rendered it impossible, in Mr.
Morley's opinion, to revive them now without exposing
ourselves to a charge of bad faith.
There remained the argument that the evacuation of
Chumbi would deprive us of our only practical means of
bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to
expedite a satisfactory settlement of the negotiations now
in progress for the revision of the Tibetan Trade Regula-
tions. But though it might be inconvenient to be deprived
of this weapon, it appeared to Mr. Morley that, since by
our own action we were precluded, for the reasons stated
above, from alleging that there had been breaches of the
Lhasa Convention of such a nature as to necessitate our
retention of Chumbi, it would be an unjustifiable exten-
sion of the interpretation to be placed on the conditions
laid down in that Convention to maintain, as we should
have in effect to do, that the marts cannot be regarded as
effectively open till the revised Trade Regulations have
been satisfactorily settled. ru he Lhasa Convention clearly
contemplates the marts being conducted under the old
Regulations, which in form were sufficiently comprehen-
sive until the new ones were introduced. It contained
no stipulation, as it well might have done, that a revision
of the Regulations satisfactory to ourselves was essential
before the marts at Gyantse and elsewhere could be held
to have been effectively opened.
The possibility had also to be borne in mind, given the
peculiarities of Chinese diplomacy, that the continued
occupation of Chumbi might have no other effect than to
increase the obstinacy of the Chinese Government in the
matter of the revision of the Regulations. In that case,
as time went on, our position would have become increas-
ingly difficult, and if our occupation was seriously pro-
tracted, as might not improbably have been the result of
delaying evacuation, the whole policy of His Majesty's
Government in Asia would to a certain degree be stultified.
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