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0222 India and Tibet : vol.1
インドとチベット : vol.1
India and Tibet : vol.1 / 222 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000295
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178   TUNA

t

was simply childish. I sent Captain O'Connor to announce

to him that General Macdonald and I had decided that   p

his men must be disarmed, but he remained sullen and   p

did nothing ; and when, after a pause, the disarmament   M

was actually commenced, he threw himself upon a sepoy,   ji

drew a revolver, and shot the sepoy in the jaw.

Not, as I think, with any deliberate intention, but from

i

sheer inanity, the signal had now been given. Other

Tibetan shots immediately followed. Simultaneously   t1

i

volleys from our own troops rang out ; the guns and

Maxims commenced to fire. Tibetan swordsmen made a   iN

rush upon any within reach, and the plucky and enter-

prising Edmund Candler, the very able correspondent of   II

the Daily Mail, received more than a dozen wounds, while   il

Major Wallace Dunlop, one of the best officers in the   i

force, was severely handled. For just one single instant   1

the Tibetans, by a concerted and concentrated rush, might   4

have broken our thin line, and have carried the Mission   n

and the military staff. But that instant passed in a flash.   .e

Before a few seconds were over, rifles and guns were dealing   1

the deadliest destruction on them in their huddled masses.

The Lhasa General himself was killed at the start, and   i

in a few minutes the whole affair was over. The plain

was strewn with dead Tibetans, and our troops instinc-   !

tively and without direct orders ceased firing—though, in   !

fact, they had only fired thirteen rounds per man.   t

It was a terrible and ghastly business ; but it was not   I

fair for an English statesman to call it a massacre of

46 unarmed men," for photographs testify that the Tibetans   o

were all armed ; and, looking back now, I do not see how   {

it could possibly have been avoided. The Tibetans after-   1

wards at Lhasa told me in all seriousness that I might

have known their General did not mean to fight, for if he

did he would not have been in the front as he was. This,

no doubt, was true, and, left to himself, he would, we

may be sure, have arranged matters with me in a per-

fectly amicable manner, for at Guru in January, and when

he came to see me at TTuna, he had always shown himself

courteous and reasonable ; and his men had no antipathy

towards us. But he had at his side, ruling and over-