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0365 India and Tibet : vol.1
インドとチベット : vol.1
India and Tibet : vol.1 / 365 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000295
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ACCEPTANCE OF TIBETAN PROPOSAL 297

! ,

three, and could not, therefore, be taken as breaking our

pledges to Russia.

Others might not think likewise. But even if they did

not, I could not see that if I agreed to the Tibetan pro-

posals, including, as they would, the right fôr us to occupy

the Chumbi Valley for seventy-five years, 1 was thereby

involving Government in • any fresh responsibility. I

should not, for instance, be giving to the inhabitants a

promise of our protection which it would be impossible for

Government to repudiate. I should be simply acquiring

for Government the right to occupy the Chumbi Valley

for seventy-five years if they wanted to, and if they did

not want to, they could go out whenever they liked. I

was not compelling the Government to occupy the

Chumbi " Valley ; I was simply acquiring the right, which

they could abrogate if they did not want it.

Arguing thus with myself, I decided finally to seize

the golden opportunity. If I let it go I knew not what

might happen. The Regent might flee. The National

Assembly might sulk. The Chinese might wake up and

put in some obstruction. By agreeing I should be doing

nothing counter to the wishes of the Government of India,

for the amount of the indemnity was what they had them-

selves suggested, and they had on June 30,* after the

pledges to Russia were given, spoken of retaining the

Chumbi Valley, the occupation of which had been urged

by the Bengal Government as far back as 1888. By agree-

ing I should also be effecting what my own experience

showed me would be by far the most satisfactory per-

manent solution of the whole question. Chumbi is

the key to Tibet. It is also the most difficult part of the

road to Lhasa. Situated in the Chumbi Valley, we should

have a clear run into Tibet, for the Tang-la (pass) across

the watershed is an open plain several miles wide. The

Chumbi Valley is the only strategical point of value in

the whole north-eastern frontier from Kashmir to Burma.

It was the surest guarantee for the fulfilment of the new

Treaty which we could possibly get, except the establish-

ment of an agent at Lhasa, and the obtaining of a * Blue-book, III., p. 36.