国立情報学研究所 - ディジタル・シルクロード・プロジェクト
| |||||||||
|
India and Tibet : vol.1 | |
インドとチベット : vol.1 |
r ""r
. '. .w
ACCEPTANCE OF TIBETAN PROPOSAL 297
! ,
three, and could not, therefore, be taken as breaking our
pledges to Russia.
Others might not think likewise. But even if they did
not, I could not see that if I agreed to the Tibetan pro-
posals, including, as they would, the right fôr us to occupy
the Chumbi Valley for seventy-five years, 1 was thereby
involving Government in • any fresh responsibility. I
should not, for instance, be giving to the inhabitants a
promise of our protection which it would be impossible for
Government to repudiate. I should be simply acquiring
for Government the right to occupy the Chumbi Valley
for seventy-five years if they wanted to, and if they did
not want to, they could go out whenever they liked. I
was not compelling the Government to occupy the
Chumbi " Valley ; I was simply acquiring the right, which
they could abrogate if they did not want it.
Arguing thus with myself, I decided finally to seize
the golden opportunity. If I let it go I knew not what
might happen. The Regent might flee. The National
Assembly might sulk. The Chinese might wake up and
put in some obstruction. By agreeing I should be doing
nothing counter to the wishes of the Government of India,
for the amount of the indemnity was what they had them-
selves suggested, and they had on June 30,* after the
pledges to Russia were given, spoken of retaining the
Chumbi Valley, the occupation of which had been urged
by the Bengal Government as far back as 1888. By agree-
ing I should also be effecting what my own experience
showed me would be by far the most satisfactory per-
manent solution of the whole question. Chumbi is
the key to Tibet. It is also the most difficult part of the
road to Lhasa. Situated in the Chumbi Valley, we should
have a clear run into Tibet, for the Tang-la (pass) across
the watershed is an open plain several miles wide. The
Chumbi Valley is the only strategical point of value in
the whole north-eastern frontier from Kashmir to Burma.
It was the surest guarantee for the fulfilment of the new
Treaty which we could possibly get, except the establish-
ment of an agent at Lhasa, and the obtaining of a * Blue-book, III., p. 36.
|
Copyright (C) 2003-2019
National Institute of Informatics(国立情報学研究所)
and
The Toyo Bunko(東洋文庫). All Rights Reserved.
本ウェブサイトに掲載するデジタル文化資源の無断転載は固くお断りいたします。