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0252 India and Tibet : vol.1
インドとチベット : vol.1
India and Tibet : vol.1 / 252 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000295
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206   GYANTSE

with Tibet, and he' fervently assured me of the good-will

of the Bhutanese, and said that they would never depart

from their friendship with the British Government.

In this interview I purposely appeared indifferent

about receiving negotiators, for the less anxious I seemed

for them to come the more likely was their arrival. As a

fact, when, a fortnight later, there really were signs of their

appearance, I asked Government to agree, which they

readily did, to grant a few days' grace beyond the 25th to

allow them to come in.

Besides this friendly support from Bhutan on our right,

we had also further evidence at this time of equally

friendly, and much more valuable, support from Nepal on

our left. The Nepalese Minister informed Colonel Raven-

shaw that he had received a letter and some presents from

the Dalai Lama, but that he made no allusion to our

Mission, which omission led the Minister to think that

the Dalai Lama was kept in ignorance of what was going

on. And this surmise was, I think, perfectly correct, and

represented one of the great difficulties with which we

had to contend. No one dared inform this little god that

things were not going as he would like them, and yet

they had to get orders from him, for they would do nothing

without his orders.

The Nepalese Minister, to remove this difficulty, wrote

early in June to the Dalai Lama, expressing his anxiety

at " the breach of relations [between India and 'Tibet]

which had been brought about by the failure of the

Tibetan Government to have the matters in dispute settled

by friendly negotiation." He referred to the letter which

he had written to the four Councillors in the previous

autumn, and he went on.: " Wise and far-seeing as you

are, the vast resources of the British Government must be

well known to you. To rush to extremes with such a big

Power, and wantonly to bring calamities upon your poor

subjects without having strong and valid grounds of your

own to insist upon, cannot readily be accepted as a

virtuous course or wise policy. Hence it may fairly be