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0111 India and Tibet : vol.1
インドとチベット : vol.1
India and Tibet : vol.1 / 111 ページ(カラー画像)

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doi: 10.20676/00000295
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VIEWS ON H.M.'S GO VERNMENT   85

of affairs on the frontier, and were compelled to recognize

that circumstances had recently occurred which threw on

them the obligation of placing our relations with the

Government of Lhasa upon a more satisfactory footing.

And they acknowledged that the proposal to send an

armed mission to enter Lhasa, by force if necessary, and

establish there a Resident, might, if the issue were simply

one between India and Tibet, be justified as a legitimate

reply to the action of the Tibetan Government in returning

the letters which on three occasions the Viceroy had

addressed to them, and in disregarding the Convention

with China of 1890. But they stated that they could not

regard the question as one concerning India and Tibet

alone. The position of China in its relations to the

Powers of Europe had been so modified in recent years

that it was necessary to take into account those altered

conditions in deciding on action affecting what still had

to be regarded as a province of China. It was true that

we had no desire either to declare a protectorate or

permanently to occupy any portion of the country. But

measures of that kind might become inevitable if we were

once to find ourselves committed to armed intervention.

For the above reasons, the Home Government thought

it necessary, before sanctioning a course which might be

regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese

Empire, to be sure that such action could be justified by

the previous action of Tibet, and they had, accordingly,

come to the conclusion that it would bep r. emature to

adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the

affairs of Tibet as thosero osed by the Government of

India. The would await, therefore, the result of their

reference to the Russian Government, and after those

explanations had been received they would be in a better

position to decide on the scope to be given to the negotia-

tions with China, and on the steps to be taken to protect

India against any danger from the establishment of foreign

influence in Tibet.

When the Russian assurances were at length received,

the purport of the conversation Lord Lansdowne had held

with the Russian Ambassador was at once communicated